Em Tradução:A Arte da Guerra/III: diferenças entre revisões

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Revisão das 18h38min de 25 de abril de 2010

Capitulo 2: Estratégia Ofensiva

  1. Sun Tzu disse: Na prática da guerra, o melhor é tomar o país do inimigo por inteiro e intacto; quebra-lo e destruí-lo não é tão bom. Por isso, é melhor recapturar um exército inteiro que destruí-lo, capturar um regimento, secção ou companhia inteiros que destruí-los.
  2. Portanto, lutar e conquistar em todas as batalhas não é a excelência suprema; a excelência suprema consiste em quebrar a resistênca do inimigo sem lutar.
  3. Assim, a forma mais elevada de comando é parar os planos inimigos; a segunda melhor é prevenir a junção das forças inimigas; a seguinte nesta ordem é atacar o exército inimigo no campo; e a pior é por cerco a cidades muralhadas.
  4. A regra é não atacar cidades muralhadas se isso poder ser evitado. A preparação de protecções, abrigos móveis, e vários objectos de guerra demorará até três meses; e empilhar montes contra os muros demorará outros três.
  5. O general, incapaz de controlar a sua raiva, lançará os homens para o assalto como um enxame de formigas, como resultado um terço dos seus homens serão abatidos, enquanto a cidade permanece incólume. Tais são os efeitos desastrosos de um cerco.

  1. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.
  2. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.
  3. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
  4. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
  5. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.
  6. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.
  7. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his army:--
  8. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
  9. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's minds.
  10. (3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
  11. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.
  12. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
    1. He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
    2. He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
    3. He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
    4. He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
    5. He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign.
  13. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.